WF consider the password-saving feature of the wand is contrary to their security goals.
and so they should
...insecure and this complete lack of communication was the main reason why we after trying to discuss it with them for a couple of years in the end decided to spoof id completely.)
by issuing a cloaking patch that applies only to WF, they are specifically interfering with transactions between WF and their clients. why wouldn't WF ban the browser? wouldn't you?
furthermore, consider that the display of ads by the free version of Opera while the browser is open on the WF site is an invitation for code injection phishing/pharming exploits. should WF wait until it actually happens?
and i found this:
As was mentionned previously, individual sites can disable the wand if they do not wish passwords to be saved on their site (truth be told, I think anybody who figures they can tell me how I should protect my data can go, uh, pleasure themselves.) The problem many sites seem to have with Opera is that Opera retains page state when using the back button on secure pages, which is a potential security issue (especially since Opera can reopen closed windows). I believe that will be fixed in Opera 7.60.
Edit: the problem isn't that Opera retains page state when using the back button on secure pages, but that it didn't follow the must-revalidate directive before 7.54u1. That is now "fixed", actually leading to reduced usability because of all the "webmasters" out there with improperly configured servers.
So WF should be expected to track the version at the .0X level? Especially when Opera is cloaking its version to begin with? Would you write code to accomodate such idiocy?
[edited by: plumsauce at 4:21 am (utc) on Feb. 3, 2005]